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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1995, and June 30, 1996, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period which are either of
particular interest to the appellate practitioner or which provide the back-
ground for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal with
substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique to
those areas. Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of issues, nor the question of whether particular errors were
harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA'S RULES OF PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted several amendments to the
various sets of Florida procedural rules that will impact the field of appellate
practice.
A. Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 9.130(a)(5) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure was
amended' to allow for appellate review of orders entered on motions filed
under Rule 12.540 of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure requesting
1. Amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, 663 So. 2d 1314 (Fla.
1995).
1996]
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relief from judgment, decrees or orders. This amendment was necessitated
by creation of the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure2 and is intended
only to continue allowing appeals from orders in family law cases that were
previously entered pursuant to Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Responding to concerns expressed by the fourth district in McFadden v.
West Palm Beach Police Officer3 regarding the need for an amendment to
the rules that would allow determinations of indigency for appellate pur-
poses to be made at the appellate level,4 the supreme court, in McFadden v.
Fourth District Court of Appeal,5 adopted an amendment accomplishing that
purpose for incarcerated parties. The amendment adds to the existing
language of Rule 9.430 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
deals with the process for obtaining an indigency determination in the lower
tribunal, the following paragraph:
In lieu of the above procedure, an indigent incarcerated party
may file in the appellate court a motion for an order of indigency,
along with an affidavit showing the party's inability either to pay
fees and costs or to give security therefor. The affidavit shall be
sufficient without more for the court to rule on the appellant's indi-
gency unless an objection is filed. If an objection is filed the ap-
pellate court may determine the issue or remand it to the lower tri-
bunal for determination.
6
Although the amended rule was made "effective immediately,"7 the
court allowed any interested person to file comments regarding the matter.s
As a result of that process, seven days later, the court entered an order
staying until further order of the court implementation of the amendment
nunc pro tunc to the date of the court's decision. Subsequently, an alterna-
tive proposal was submitted by the Appellate Court Rules Committee and it
is presently pending before the court.
The supreme court created an interesting situation when it amended
both the criminal and appellate rules in an effort to ensure that criminal
2. In re Family Law Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1995).
3. 658 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
4. Id. at 1048.
5. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S183 (Apr. 25, 1996).
6. Id. at S184.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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defendants will have the opportunity to raise sentencing errors on appeal. In
Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) and Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800,9 the court created a new Rule 3.800(b)
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: "(b) Motion to
Correct Sentencing Error. A defendant may file a motion to correct the
sentence or order of probation within ten days after rendition of the sen-
tence."10 At the same time, the court amended Rule 9.020(g) of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide that a timely filed motion to correct
a sentence or an order of probation delays rendition of the sentence or order
until the motion is ruled upon."
Taken together, these two amendments appear to create an anomaly.
The criminal rule indicates that a motion to correct a sentencing error is
timely if filed within ten days after rendition, but the appellate rule states the
timely filing of such a motion acts to delay rendition until its disposition.
The net effect is that the time period within which the motion must be filed
does not start to run until the motion has been disposed of.
At the time it adopted these amendments, the court also amended Rule
9.020(g)(3) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to state that "a
pending motion to correct a sentence or order of probation shall not be
affected by the filing of a notice of appeal from a judgment of guilt. ' 12
B. Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
Rule 2.050(h) of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration was
amended 13 to provide that in any case in which a defendant has been sen-
tenced to death, the circuit judge assigned to the case "shall take such action
as may be necessary to assure that a complete record on appeal has been
properly prepared"'14 and that "the judge shall convene a status conference
with all counsel of record as soon as possible after the record has been
prepared... to ensure that the record is complete."'
5
9. 675 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1996).
10. FLA. R. CIuM. P. 3.800(b). This rule is entitled "Motion to Correct Sentencing Er-
ror."
11. Amendment to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) and Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure 3.800, 675 So. 2d at 1375.
12. Id. at 1375-76.
13. In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration Regarding Death
Cases, 672 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1996).
14. Id. at 524.
15. Id.
1996]
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C. Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure
The supreme court adopted extensive revisions to the portion of the
Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure that deals with appel-
late proceedings. 16 In light of the large number of changes to the rules, no
effort will be made here to detail every amendment that was approved.
However, some of the more significant revisions will be discussed.
An effort was made to streamline the rules by deleting rules that were
unnecessary or duplicative of the appellate rules and by creating a new rule,
rule 4.156, which provides that "[a]ppellate review proceedings in workers'
compensation cases shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure (civil) except as otherwise provided by these rules."'17 The rules
deleted in their entirety and their appellate rule counterparts [in brackets] are
rules 4.180(e) [9.200(f)(2)]; 4.225 [9.210(g)]; 4.240 [9.320]; 4.250 [9.330];
4.255 [9.331]; 4.260 [9.340].18
Rule 4.160 was amended in response to the first district's invitation in
Hines Electric v. McClure19 to the Workers' Compensation Rules Committee
to address certain problems that arose from the fact that the rule made review
of certain non-final orders discretionary with the court.20 The amended rule
requires the court to consider appeals of some of the orders in question and
divests it of the jurisdiction to consider appeals from certain other orders.2'
A new provision was added indicating that nothing in the rule should be
interpreted as precluding other original proceedings in the district court as
provided in the appellate rules.22 Presumably, this provision was intended to
clarify that when the appropriate requirements are met, orders that formerly
fell within the court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction can still be
considered by certiorari.
Rule 4.161(b) was amended to reflect that the district court upon motion
shall decide disputes as to whether challenges to certain benefits have been
abandoned.23
16. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664
So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1995).
17. Id. at 945.
18. 1995 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.156.
In re Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 946.
19. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
20. For a discussion of the problems identified in Hines Electric, see Anthony C. Musto,
Appellate Practice: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1, 28-30 (1993).
21. Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 946.
22. Id. at 947.
23. Id. at 948-49.
[Vol. 21:13
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Rule 4.165 was amended to require that a conformed copy of the order
or orders designated in a notice of appeal be attached to the notice24 and to
provide that notices of cross-appeal are no longer to be filed with the judge,
but are to be filed directly with the district court.
25
Deleted from rule 4.180(a)(1) was a provision which allowed the
district court to consider matters not introduced into evidence if necessary
for the determination of the issues on appeal.26
Rule 4.180 (g)(1) was renumbered as (f)(1) and was revised to make the
procedures for relief from the filing fee and from the costs of the record on
appeal consistent with changes to section 57.081(1) of the Florida Statutes,
as amended by Chapter 94-318 section 18 of the Laws of Florida, and with
the dictates of caselaw,27 specifically Schwab v. Brevard County School
Board28 and Miller v. Hospitality Care Center.29
HI. COURT DmSIONS
In an unpublished order captioned Local Rule Concerning Divisions in
First District Court of Appeal, the supreme court approved as a local rule an
administrative order30 adopted by the First District Court of Appeal that
created a criminal division of that court. The administrative order provides
that the new division will consider "[a]ll criminal cases and all cases that
originate from prisoners involving their conviction or sentence, juvenile
delinquency cases, and criminal derivative actions such as gain time or
parole decision challenges, original writ proceedings, including but not
limited to habeas corpus. 31
The approval of this rule gives the first district, which had previously
created a General and an Administrative Division,32 three subject matter
divisions. It remains the only Florida appellate court to sit in divisions.
24. Id at 950.
25. Id at 951.
26. Workers' Compensation Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 951.
27. See 1995 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure
4.180. Workers Compensaton Procedure, 664 So. 2d at 955-56.
28. 650 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). For a discussion of the decision in
Schwab, see Anthony C. Musto, Appellate Practice: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L.
REv. 1, 23-25 (1995).
29. 431 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
30. Fla. First District Court of Appeal Admin. Order No. 95-2.
31. Id. at 1.
32. See In re Court Divisions, 648 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
1996]
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IV. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America,3 the supreme court dealt with a case in which the fourth
district had upheld a judgment against two defendants.3 4 One of the defen-
dants timely filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied some three
months later.35 Within thirty days of the denial, but 114 days after the
opinion, the other defendant filed a notice invoking the supreme court's
discretionary jurisdiction.36
The plaintiff moved to strike the notice as untimely and to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the notice was not filed within thirty days
of rendition, as required by Rule 9.120(b) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.37 The plaintiff relied on rule 9.120(g), which provides that
rendition is delayed by the pendency of motions for rehearing, but which
also states that when such a motion is pending, "the final order shall not be
deemed rendered with respect to any claim between the movant and any
party against whom relief is sought by the motion. 38
The court found this rule to be inapplicable, however, concluding that it
applied only to orders entered by trial courts.39 The court buttressed its
finding by noting that when the rule was amended to include the relevant
portion, both the court's opinion40 and the Report of The Florida Bar
Appellate Court Rules Committee explained that the amendment was to
clarify that in a multi-party situation, a single order can be rendered at
different times depending on when the trial court resolved authorized post-
trial motions.4'
"In contrast," 42 the court continued, "the motions permitted in an
appellate proceeding follow the procedure set forth in" Rule 9.300 of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.43 That rule states that "service of a
33. 675 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1996).
34. See Florida Medical Malpractice Underwriting Ass'n v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 652 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
35. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. FLA. R. App. P. 9.120(g)(1).
39. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591.
40. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d 516, 517
(Fla. 1992).
41. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 591-92.
42. Id. at 592.
43. Id.
[Vol. 21:13
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motion shall toll the time schedule of any proceeding in the court until
disposition of the motion." 44 This provision, the court found, "is clear on its
face that it suspends the time schedule of any and all proceedings irrespec-
tive of the movant." 45 The court therefore denied the plaintiff's motion,
concluding "that appellate motions are governed by rule 9.300(b), and a
district court's order is not 'rendered' until there has been a disposition of all
motions relative to that order."
46
V. VENUE
A. When Changes of Venue Are Deemed Effective
In Cottingham v. State,47 the supreme court clarified an aspect of its
decision in Vasilinda v. Lozano,4 which established the standards for
determining in which court appellate jurisdiction lies when the trial court has
granted a change of venue to a circuit court located within another district.
In Vasilinda, the court found that if a change of venue has not yet become
effective when appellate jurisdiction is invoked, the appellate proceeding
goes to the district court to which appeals are taken from the transferor
court.49 Conversely, the court found, when the change of venue has become
effective, the appellate proceeding goes to the district court to which appeals
are taken from the transferee court.
50
The decision in Cottingham focused on the issue of when changes of
venue are deemed effective in civil cases. The court in Vasilinda had
discussed that question, concluding that changes of venue in civil cases
become effective when the court file has been received in the transferee
court and costs and service charges required by the applicable statutes and
rules of procedure are paid.5'
In the decision under review in Cottingham, the first district had
certified as being of great public importance the question of whether the date
44. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.300(b).
45. St. Paul Fire, 675 So. 2d at 592.
46. Id.
47. 672 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1996).
48. 631 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1994).
49. Id. at 1087.
50. ML
51. Id.
1996]
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of payment of the costs and charges is the date they are mailed by the party
responsible for payment or the date of receipt by the transferee court.52
The supreme court found that the date of receipt by the transferee court
is deemed to be the date of payment, and thus the date on which the change
of venue is effective.
53
B. Venue in Appeals from Orders of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission
In Mendelman v. Dade County Public Schools,54 the third district had
for review a decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. The
unemployment appeal hearing had been conducted by telephone, with the
claimant participating from Key Largo, the employer from Miami, and the
appeals referee from Tallahassee.
55
The Commission moved to transfer the case to the first district, relying
on section 443.151(4)(e), of the Florida Statutes, which states that appeals
of commission orders are to go to the district court "in the appellate district
in which the issues involved were decided by an appeals referee .... ,,56 The
Commission reasoned that since the written ruling was issued by its Talla-
hassee office, the appeal could only go the first district.
57
The third district disagreed, noting that the proceeding at which the
referee reaches a decision is the final hearing and concluding that when the
participants are located in two appellate districts, "the fairest interpretation
of the statute is that the appeal will lie in either appellate district." 58
The court indicated that a factor demonstrating that its interpretation of
the statute is workable is the "many years' experience under the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for judicial review either in
'the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the agency
52. Cottingham, 672 So. 2d at 28. For a recitation of the complicated factual circum-
stances that led to the certified question, as well as a more complete statement of the standards
established by Vasilinda, see Musto, supra note 28, at 18-20.
53. Cottingham, 672 So. 2d at 29-30.
54. 674 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Key Largo is located in Monroe County, which constitutes the sixteenth circuit, a part
of the third district. Miami is located in Dade County, which constitutes the eleventh circuit, a
part of the third district. Tallahassee is located in Leon County, which is one of the counties
in the second circuit, a part of the first district.
56. FLA. STAT. § 443.151(4)(e) (1995).
57. Mendelman, 674 So. 2d at 196.
58. Id.
[Vol. 21:13
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maintains its headquarters or where a party resides."' 59 The court also stated
that in taking its view, it was "influenced by practical considerations,"
' 6
specifically the fact that it generally grants requests for oral argument in
unemployment compensation appeals and the court's belief that its interpre-
tation would therefore "provide more convenient access to the appellate
courts.'
The decision in Mendelman raises a number of questions about the rule
of law applicable to other factual situations. For instance, if a claimant and
an employer participate from locations in two different districts, while the
appeals referee is in a third, is a party taking an appeal able to select venue
from among three district courts? Does the rule of law set forth in Mendel-
man apply if a party who lives in one district travels to another district and
participates in a hearing for the sole purpose of being able to subsequently
appeal to the court of appeal for that district? Can parties and their attorneys
expand the number of possible venues by participating from different
locations? If a party participates on a cellular phone while driving through
several districts, can an appeal go to any of those districts? To the extent
that the practical consideration of providing convenient access for oral
argument underlies the rule of law adopted in Mendelman, would a different
conclusion be reached when the oral argument in the more distant court
would be heard by video teleconference? 62
These questions and others will likely have to be dealt with at some
point. If they prove too troublesome, consideration of whether the third
district's approach should be abandoned in favor of the position advocated
by the commission in Mendelman might also become a question that will
need to be addressed.
59. Id. at 196 (footnote) (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.68(2) (1995)).
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id.
62. In In re Oral Argument By Video Teleconference Network, 648 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the first district established. remote facilities for arguments by video
teleconference. That court is presently conducting such arguments only when all attorneys
expected to present argument are located near a single remote facility. Since the attorney
representing the commission in Mendleman was from Tallahassee, and since it appears that the
appellant, who represented himself on appeal, was from south Florida, this factor apparently
had no applicability in that case. It may well play a role in striking the proper balance in
future cases, however. For instance, if the parties are both from Ft. Myers, one of the
locations at which the first district has established a remote facility, it would clearly be more
convenient for the parties to present oral argument to the first district by video teleconference
than it would be to travel to either Tampa or Lakeland, the locations at which the second
district, which includes Ft. Myers, generally hears oral arguments.
1996]
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VI. ORDERS REVIEWABLE
The courts decided a large number of cases dealing with the issue of
whether certain orders were reviewable, either by appeal or by certiorari.
The sheer volume of such cases precludes discussion of the reasoning of
each case. This article will therefore focus on some of the more significant
cases in this regard and set forth a sampling of other decisions, noting the
type of order involved, and the conclusion reached by the court as to whether
it was reviewable.
A. Orders Denying Motions to Dismiss Based on Claims of Untimely
Service
Concluding that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on the
failure to effect service within 120 days, as required by Rule 1.070(i) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, is not appealable, the second district
dismissed the appeal in Nowry v. Collyar.63 The court recognized, however,
that its decision was in conflict with decisions of other districts64 and it
certified the following question to the supreme court:
DOES AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS A
COMPLAINT CLAIMING UNTIMELY SERVICE PURSUANT
TO FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.070(i) FAIL TO
CONSTITUTE AN ORDER DETERMINING THE JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE PERSON,[65 1 THUS MAKING IT A NONAP-
PEALABLE, NON-FINAL ORDER?
66
The first district addressed the same issue in Novella Land, Inc. v.
Panama City Beach Office Park, Ltd.,67 noting the conflict recognized in
Nowry and agreeing with the second district that such orders are not appeal-
63. 666 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
64. See Comisky v. Rosen Management Servs., Inc., 630 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (en bane); Mid-Florida Assocs., Ltd. v. Taylor, 641 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
65. Orders determining the jurisdiction of the person are appealable pursuant to Rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(I) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.
66. Nowry, 666 So. 2d at 556.
67. 662 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
[Vol. 21:13
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able.68 The first district also pointed out that the third district in RD & G
Leasing, Inc. v. Stebnickt69 had reached a similar conclusion. 0
B. Declaratory Judgments
In Canal Insurance Co. v. Reed,71 the supreme court determined that
when an insurance coverage issue has been decided in a third party declara-
tory judgment action between an insurer and its insured prior to a final
determination of liability in the underlying action, and, as a result, the
insurer must provide liability coverage for the insured in the underlying
action, the order entered in the declaratory judgment action is a final order
72subject to appellate review. Pointing out that under section 86.011 of the
Florida Statutes, "a declaratory judgment has 'the force and effect of a final
judgment,' ,73 the court found itself "compelled to find that a declaratory
judgment is appealable as a final order regardless of whether the judgment is
rendered in a separate declaratory judgment action or as part of a third-party
action such as that at issue here."
74
Although finding the declaratory judgment regarding a determination of
insurance coverage to be reviewable as a final order, the court stated that it
"must also stress that such a judgment will not automatically result in a stay
in the independent underlying cause of action. 7 5 The court explained that
"[t]his is because the underlying personal injury action is separate and
distinct from the insurance coverage dispute"76 and that "[t]he trial judge has
the discretion to stay the underlying action between the parties pending
resolution of the appeal or to permit it to continue concurrently with the
appeal process. 7
The court acknowledged that "it would be in the best interests of all the
parties for coverage issues to be resolved as soon as possible."78 The court
therefore "suggest[ed] that the district courts expedite review of appeals
68. Id. at 794.
69. 626 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
70. Novella Land, 662 So. 2d at 743.
71. 666 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1996).
72. Id. at 889-90.
73. Id at 891 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (1995)).
74. Canal Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d at 891.
75. Id. at 892.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
1996]
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involving the sole issue of coverage 79 and "that the Appellate Court Rules
Committee consider an appropriate method for providing expedited review
of these cases to avoid unnecessary delays in the final resolution of the
underlying actions."
8 °
C. Orders Denying Motions for Summary Judgment Based on Claims
of Sovereign Immunity
In Department of Education v. Roe,8' the supreme court rejected an
effort to extend to claims of sovereign immunity the rationale of Tucker v.
Resha,82 which held that with regard to federal civil rights claims brought in
state courts, public officials are entitled to interlocutory review of orders
denying motions for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified
immunity.83 The decision in Tucker was based on the fact "that qualified
immunity of a public official best achieves its purpose as an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability"84 and the fact that such immunity
"is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. 85
The court relied on a number of factors in declining to extend the
Tucker rationale beyond the facts of that case. These factors included: 1)
the fact that permitting interlocutory appeals when claims of sovereign
immunity are rejected would "add substantially to the caseloads of the
district courts of appeal;, 86 2) the fact that since "the applicability of the
sovereign immunity waiver is [often] inextricably tied to the underlying
facts, [thus] requiring a trial on the merits .... many interlocutory decisions
would be inconclusive and ... a waste of judicial resources; '87 3) the fact
that "qualified immunity is rooted in the need to protect public officials from
undue interference, whereas sovereign immunity is not; ' 88 and 4) the fact
that in Tucker, the court "had an interest in affording federal causes of action
brought in state court the same treatment they would receive if brought in
79. Canal Ins. Co., 666 So. 2d at 892.
80. Id.
81. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S311 (July 18, 1996).
82. 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994).
83. Id. at 1190.
84. Roe, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at S311.
85. Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1189 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
86. Roe, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at S312.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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federal court,"8 9 while sovereign immunity cases deal "with a state law
defense to an ordinary state law cause of action." 90
D. Nonappealable Orders
Orders deemed to be nonappealable included: An order denying a
motion to amend a complaint to add a punitive damage claim;91 a partial
summary judgment on liability as to four counts of a six-count complaint,
when those counts, although based on different legal theories, were interre-
lated with and interdependent on the two remaining counts; 92 a non-final
order striking a pleading as a discovery violation sanction;93 a final order of
the Board of Clinical Laboratory Personnel granting a petition for a clinical
laboratory supervisor license;94 an order setting aside a clerk's default;95 an
order denying a motion to dissolve an agreement to engage in alternative
dispute resolution when the parties had already entered into the resolution
process; 96 and a non-final order striking a defendant's compulsory counter-
claim.
97
E. Orders Reviewable by Certiorari
Orders found to be reviewable by certiorari included: An order trans-
ferring a case from circuit court to county court;98 an order granting a motion
to conduct a postverdict jury interview;99 and an order requiring production
of records and documents asserted to be confidential as work product and by
operation of the attorney-client privilege, or, in the alternative, the construc-
tion of a log which indicated the date of each document, its type, and its
general contents.1°
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. King v. Odle, 665 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
92. El Segundo Original Rey De La Pizza Cubana, Inc. v. Rey Pizza Corp., 676 So. 2d
1031 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
93. Hi-Tech Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Thiem, 659 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
94. Agency For Health Care Admin. v. Board of Clinical Lab. Personnel, 673 So. 2d 531
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
95. Collins v. Penske Truck Leasing, 668 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 664 So.
2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
97. Cole v. Bayley Prods., Inc., 661 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
98. David v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 676 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
99. Pesci v. Maistrellis, 672 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
100. Calzon v. Capital Bank, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2603 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 29,
1995).
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F. Orders Not Reviewable by Certiorari
Orders held not to be reviewable by certiorari included: An order
denying a motion to consolidate two separate lawsuits when the case does
did fall within the catagory of cases in which the possibility of repugnant
and inconsistent verdicts would result in a manifest injustice and a material
injury to the petitioners; °10 an order denying a motion to strike a demand for
a jury trial;102 an order denying a motion in limine to exclude expert scien-
tific testimony;10 3 an order determining that a prior judgment of dissolution
of marriage was not res judicata on the issue of paternity;" 4 an order on a
motion in limine precluding the introduction of evidence regarding insurance
coverage;105 and an order prohibiting a plaintiff from engaging in ex parte
communications with any of the defendant's employees.'
16
VII. RENDITION
A. Delay in Rendition Due to Pendency of Motion for Rehearing
In Pennington v. Waldheim,'0 7 the trial court entered a series of final
summary judgments in favor of the defendants. 10 8 Within the time period
contemplated by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for service of motions
for new trial or rehearing, the plaintiff filed, but did not serve, a motion for
rehearing. °9 Several weeks later, the defendants learned of the motion and
moved to strike it." 0 The plaintiff asserted that the failure to serve the
defendants was due to clerical error and contended that the defendants had
101. Friedman v. Desoto Park N. Condominium Ass'n, 678 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
102. Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
103. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Glazer, 671 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Elder v. Department of Revenue, 670 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
105. Riano v. Heritage Corp. of S. Fla., 665 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
106. Boyd v. Pheo, Inc., 664 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
107. 669 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
108. Id. at 1159.
109. Rule 1.530(b) of the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure provides that such motions
shall be served not later than 10 days after the judgment. In Pennington, the 10th day was a
Sunday, so the time period for seeking rehearing was extended by the dictates of rule 1.090(a)
until the following day. The motion in the case was filed on that following day and was
therefore timely.
110. Pennington, 669 So. 2d at 1159.
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not been prejudiced."' The plaintiff also filed a pleading entitled "'Motion
for Relief in Accordance with Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.540,
'
,u12
requesting "'relief from 'damage resulting from clerical error in failing to
properly serve defendants on a timely basis."" 13 The trial court granted the
defendants' motions and denied the motion filed by the plaintiff."4 On the
thirtieth day after the trial court's ruling, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
from the orders granting final summary judgment." 5
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the appeal was un-
timely. The fifth district, "writ[ing] to warn counsel of the danger posed by
the failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(b), 1 16
agreed. The court noted that under Rule 9.110(b) of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure, notices of appeal must be filed within thirty days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed 17 and that under rule 9.020(g), rendi-
tion is suspended by a motion for rehearing only when the motion is
"authorized and timely.""18 The court concluded that rendition was not
suspended in Pennington because, under the civil rules, the motion had to be
served within ten days in order to be timely. 19 Since the motion was
untimely, so was the notice of appeal and dismissal was therefore man-
dated.1 20 "Although it may be counter-intuitive for civil lawyers to view
service as an event of jurisdictional dimension,"' 2' the court wrote, "in the
case of this particular rule, timely filing is of no moment, timely service is
everything."'
122
The question of whether a motion had to be served or filed within the
appropriate time period was also at issue in Department of Revenue v.
Loveday.'23 There, the appellee moved to dismiss as untimely an appeal
from a child support judgment, asserting that the pendency of a motion to
vacate under former Rule 1.491(f) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
111. Id.
112. l
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Pennington, 669 So. 2d at 1159.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Pennington, 669 So. 2d at 1160.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 659 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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served on the tenth day after the judgment was entered, did not delay
rendition of the judgment.1 24
The court pointed out that "[u]nlike most of the rules of civil proce-
dure"' 2 this rule, which allowed parties to "move to vacate the order within
10 days from the date of entry"'126 did not state whether the motion had to be
served or whether it had to be filed within the ten days. 127 "Because this
motion is similar to a motion for rehearing, which must be served within 10
days,"' 28 the court stated, "and because most other time requirements in the
rules are governed by service, we interpret the rule as requiring a party to
serve a motion to vacate within ten days of the entry of the order."'1
29
This determination did not end the court's inquiry, however. The court
noted that only "authorized and timely" motions under Rule 9.020(g) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure delay rendition of an order and that
the list of such motions in that rule does not include motions to vacate under
former rule 1.49 1.130 Drawing the same analogy it drew in deciding the issue
of whether the motion had to be served or filed within ten days in order to be
timely, the court found that the motion "functions as a motion to rehear,
alter, or amend a judgment.,"131  Since such motions are listed in rule
9.020(g) as being among those that suspend rendition, the court found that
the motion to vacate had that effect as well.
Given these two conclusions,' 32 the court found that the thirty-day
period within which a notice of appeal must be filed 133 did not start to run
until the trial court's disposition of the motion to vacate, and that the notice
124. Id at 1240.
125. Id. at 1241.
126. Id
127. Id.
128. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1241.
129. Id. It is not likely that the court's conclusion in this regard will have a significant
precedential impact. The rule that the court interpreted has been deleted from the civil rules
and incorporated into the new family rules as Rule 12.491 (f) of the Florida Family Law Rules
of Procedure. The new family law rule states that a party "may move to vacate the order by
filing a motion to vacate within ten days form the date of entry." FLA. FAM. LAW R. P.
12.491(0.
130. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1241.
131. Id.
132. The court also rejected a claim that the motion did not delay rendition because it was
not heard within 10 days. Id. at 1242.
133. FLA. R. App. P. 9.110(b).
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in Loveday, filed within that period, was therefore timely.134 The motion to
dismiss was therefore denied.
135
B. Orders Denying Motions
In Turner v. State,136 the second district found no appealable order to
exist when the record disclosed a handwritten margin note on the face of a
motion for post-conviction relief that read "Denied 11/2/95,' 37 and that was
followed by some symbol that appeared to be initials. 38  Noting that in
Gibson v. State,139 it had disapproved of the use of a rubber stamped denial
signed by a trial judge and entered on the face of a motion for postconviction
relief, the court stated: "Here we have even less. ' 14° The appeal was
therefore dismissed with directions to the trial court to reconsider the motion
and to "render an appropriate order susceptible of this court's review.,' 4'
C. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
In State v. Siegel,142 the state attempted to appeal an order granting a
motion to suppress evidence. 43 When it was learned that no signed, written
order was ever entered, 144 the state moved to temporarily relinquish jurisdic-
tion for the entry of an order.145 The fifth district denied the motion and
dismissed the appeal.146 The court recognized that Rule 9.110(m) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure "permits an appeal to proceed where
an appealable order is rendered prior to dismissal of a premature appeal,"'147
but pointed out that this provision is applicable only to final orders.
48
134. Loveday, 659 So. 2d at 1242.
135. Id
136. 667 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
137. Id. at 882.
138. Id.
139. 642 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
140. Turner, 667 So. 2d at 882.
141. Id
142. 662 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
143. Id. at 1014.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Siegel, 662 So. 2d at 1014.
148. Id.
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VIII. NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Westfield Insurance Co. v. Sloan,149 the fifth district considered a
motion to dismiss that was based on the fact that, after the time for filing a
notice of appeal had run, an amended notice was filed adding an appellant to
the single appellant that had been named on the original, timely-filed
notice.15°
The court noted that Rule 9.110(d) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that the notice contain the name and designation of at
least one party on each side 15 and that the 1977 Committee Note to the rule
states that the advisory committee did not intend for defects on a notice of
appeal to be "jurisdictional or grounds for disposition unless the complain-
ing party was substantially prejudiced."'152 The court also pointed to rule
9.040(d), which provides:
At any time in the interest of justice, the court may permit any part
of the proceeding to be amended so that it may be disposed of on
the merits. In the absence of amendment, the court may disregard
any procedural error or defect that does not adversely affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
153
Finding no substantial prejudice to have been alleged or to be apparent, the
court denied the motion to dismiss.
54
The fifth district's approach in this case appears to conflict with the
conclusion reached by the third district in Ashraf v. Smith, 5 5 a case in which
a motion to amend a notice of appeal to include the appellant's insurer was
denied. 56  Although the court found the amendment "entirely unneces-
sary" 57 under the facts of the case, the denial of the motion was based on the
court's determination that it "lack[ed] the jurisdiction to permit such an
amendment."1
58
149. 671 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 996).
150. Id. at 882.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(d)
154. Westfield, 671 So. 2d at 883.
155. 647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 658 So. 2d 989 (Fla.
1995).
156. Id. at 893.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Despite the decision in Ashraf, the third district, in Eisman v. Ross,159
applying an analysis virtually identical to that of the fifth district in West-
field, granted a motion to amend mandate to include as a party appellant the
name of an individual who was not named on the notice of appeal but who
was listed as a party litigant on the supersedes bond posted for the appeal.16°
IX. BOND
The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal in School Board of Hillsbor-
ough County v. Lara,161 because the appellant, a public body, failed to post
the bond required by section 440.25(5)(c) of the Florida Statutes, for appeals
from orders of judges of compensation claims. 62 The first district concluded
that the application of this statutory bond requirement to the appellant would
conflict with the dictates of Rule 9.310(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, which provides that the filing of a notice of appeal by a
public body operates as an automatic stay pending review 63 and which, as is
made clear by the Committee Note to the rule,164 contemplates that the
automatic stay is to be without bond.1 65 The court stated that to the extent
that the statute and the rule conflict, the rule must control. 166 In light of this
determination, the court denied the motion to dismiss.
67
X. BRIEFS
A. Form
In Kennedy v. Guarantee Management Services, Inc.,' 68 the third
district found that the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, had erred
in dismissing an appeal because the appellant submitted his brief in hand-
written form, rather than having it typed. 69 The district court concluded that
159. 664 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
160. Id, at 1129.
161. 667 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Id. at 368.
163. Id.
164. 1977 Committee Note to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310.
165. Lara, 667 So. 2d at 368-69.
166. Id. at 369.
167. Id.
168. 667 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
169. Id. at 1014.
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the circuit court's action had deprived the appellant of his right of access to
the courts. 
170
B. Supplemental Briefs
In Dagostino v. State,'7 1 a case in which the appellant was represented
by the Public Defender's office, the fourth district dealt with a request by the
appellant's attorney to accept the appellant's pro se brief as a supplemental
brief.
The court denied the motion,17 2 pointing out that when defendants are
represented by counsel on appeal, they do not have an absolute right to
participate and represent themselves.
73
The court "caution[ed] that the filing of pro se briefs after the public
defender has briefed the case does not aid in"' 174 resolving appeals "in some
orderly process."'
75
Noting the high regard it has for the Public Defender's office, the court
indicated that its action in denying the motion was "to reinforce that confi-
dence, not to undermine it' ' 176 and that accepting supplemental briefs in such
situations "would weaken the constitutional right to counsel afforded to all
indigent criminal appellants."'
77
XI. CERTIORARI
A. Procedure
Two opinions provided insight into the manner in which district courts
analyze petitions for certiorari. Reviewing a petition that sought review of
the denial of a motion to strike a demand for jury trial in Parkway Bank v.
Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc.,178 the second district discussed the
"confusing distinction between a dismissal of a certiorari petition for lack of
170. Id.
171. 675 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 195.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 196.
175. Id.
176. Dagostino, 675 So. 2d at 196.
177. Id.
178. 658 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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jurisdiction and a denial of a petition after a review of the nonfinal order on
its merits.' 79
The court noted that "case law usually explains that a certiorari petition
must pass a three-prong test before an appellate court can grant relief from
an erroneous interlocutory order."' 80 Under this test, the court explained,
"[a] petitioner must establish (1) a departure from the essential requirements
of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the trial (3)
that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal."'181 The court stated that
"[w]hile this traditional test is correct, the grammar of the test places the
description of the appellate court's standard of review on the merits before
the two threshold tests used to determine jurisdiction.' 8 2
This characterization of the test was based on the court's determination
that the second and third prongs deal with the court's jurisdiction to consider
a petition for certiorari and that the first prong establishes the standard to be
applied on the merits if jurisdiction is found to exist. As stated by the court,
"a petitioner must establish that an interlocutory order creates material harm
irreparable by postjudgment appeal before this court has power to determine
whether the order departs from the essential requirements of the law.'
' 83
After drawing the distinction between the jurisdictional prongs of the test
and the one relating to the merits of the case, the court proceeded to address
the proper manner for disposing of petitions. "If the jurisdictional prongs of
the standard three-part test are not fulfilled,"' 8 4 the court said, "then the
petition should be dismissed rather than denied.' 85
In Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire,186 the fourth district, with the excep-
tion of one "small quibble,"' 87 expressed its "complete agreement" with
Parkway Bank.'88 Concluding that "harm is not irreparable if it can be
corrected on final appeal,"'189 the court decided to "merge the second and
third prongs into a single one."
190
179. Id. at 648.
180. Id
181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id.
183. Parkway Bank, 658 So. 2d at 649.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 670 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc).
187. Id. at 156 n.3.
188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis omitted).
190. Id.
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Noting, in the same manner as did the second district in Parkway
Bank,'9' that "in the past we have not been careful to make our jurisdictional
decisions in these cases manifest,"'192 and that "[m]ore often than not, we
have denied such petitions when we were really deciding that we lacked
jurisdiction,"'193 the court "seized on the present occasion to clarify our
dispositions and manner of proceeding."'
' 94
The court stated that when it receives a certiorari petition that seeks
review of a nonfinal order, it will "initially study it only to determine if
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of the element of irreparable
harm."
, 195
If the petitioner has failed to make such a showing, the court will
dismiss the petition. 96 On the other hand, if the petitioner meets this burden,
the court will then "study the petition to determine whether it makes a prima
facie showing that the order to be reviewed departs from the essential
requirements of law."
97
If the petition fails to make a prima facie demonstration of a departure,
the petition will be denied.198 If it does make such a showing, an order to
show cause why the petition should not be granted will be entered. 99 After
considering the response, if the court determines that there has been an
insufficient showing of irreparable harm or injury, it will dismiss the
petition. 2°° If it determines that the order under review does not depart from
the essential requirements of law, or if it decides that it will not exercise its
discretion to grant the writ, the court will deny the petition.20'
The court went on to discuss the effects of the two manners of rejecting
petitions for certiorari. "[A] dismissal of a petition seeking common law
certiorari represents only a determination that we lack jurisdiction and
nothing more, 20 2 the court said. "[A] bare denial by simple order of a
petition for common law certiorari review of a pretrial order will not
191. Parkway Bank, 658 So. 2d at 649 n.1.
192. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 157.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 157.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 157.
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represent a determination on the merits of the order to be reviewed,"203 the
court continued, "unless an opinion denying the petition indicates that
preclusive effect is intended. ' 2 4
The court noted its agreement with the second district's decision in Don
Mott Agency, Inc. v. Harrison,°5 which found that a denial without opinion
of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not an affirmance, does not establish
the law of the case, cannot be construed as passing upon any of the issues in
the litigation, and would not be res judicata as to the issues raised in thepetition.2°
B. Record
In DSA Marine Sales & Service, Inc. v. County of Manatee,0 7 the
petitioners sought certiorari review in the circuit court of the disapproval by
a board of county commissioners of a construction proposal.2 The petition
was accompanied with a motion to supplement the record as more docu-
ments became available.20 9 Shortly thereafter, the petitioner filed an
amended petition with a more thorough, but not yet completed, appendix.
210
The circuit court never ruled on the motion to supplement and denied the
amended petition without ordering a response on the merits, finding that the
petitioners failed to make a prima facie showing for relief. 211 The petitioners
moved for rehearing, seeking, among other things, guidance detailing the
insufficiency of the petition and an opportunity to amend once again.212
Reviewing the order of denial, the second district recognized that
"[b]ecause certiorari petitions must be filed within thirty days from the date
of rendition of the subject order, it is sometimes impossible to compile and
contemporaneously file the entire record as an appendix to the petition. 2 3
The court also stated that although "[s]everal elements are embraced in the
notion of procedural due process, none [are] more important than the right to
203. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted).
204. Id.
205. 362 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
206. Bared, 670 So. 2d at 158.
207. 661 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
208. Id. at 908.
209. Id
210. IM
211. Id.
212. DSA, 661 So. 2d at 908.
213. Id. at 909.
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be heard., 214 Under the circumstances of this case, the court found that the
summary denial of the petition deprived the petitioner of procedural due
process.215
C. Order to Show Cause
In City of Kissimmee v. Grice,216 a police officer whose employment
was terminated filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court, which
ordered the City to show cause why relief should not be granted.21 7 The City
moved to dismiss, asserting that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 1 8 Although the motion was denied,21 9 the City failed to file a
response to the order to show cause. 220 The circuit court granted the writ,
221
but "merely stated conclusions of law without indicating how the city
departed from the essential requirements of law' 222 in terminating the
officer.
On appeal, the fifth district found that the lack of response to an order
to show cause "is not tantamount to a default which automatically entitles
the petitioner to his requested relief. ' 223 The court indicated that although
the failure to respond "does limit the court's consideration to the information
contained in the record and the. allegations contained in the petition[,] ...
[s]till the court must determine if the petition is meritorious and whether the
requested relief should be granted. 224
The district court quashed the circuit court's order, characterizing it as
"in essence, a 'Per Curiam Reversal,"' 225 and stated, "[a]lthough a decision
under review may be affirmed without opinion, indicating that the presump-
tion of correctness accorded the lower tribunal had not been rebutted, an
appellate court has the responsibility to write opinions in all reversals. 226
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 669 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
217. Id. at 308.
218. Id. at 309.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 308.
221. Grice, 669 So. 2d at 309.
222. Id. at 309 n.1.
223. Id. at 308.
224. Id. (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
226. Grice, 669 So. 2d at 309.
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XII. AMIcus CURIAE
In Ciba-Geigy Ltd. v. Fish Peddler, Inc.,227 the fourth district offered
guidance as to the role an amicus curiae should play in an appeal. The court
noted that a brief from an amicus curiae is "generally for the purpose of
assisting the court in cases which are of general public interest, or aiding in
the presentation of difficult issues.' 22 The court also stated that "[a]lthough
'by the nature of things an amicus is not normally impartial,' amicus briefs
should not argue the facts in issue.'
229
Applying these principles, the court denied one of two requests for
leave to file an amicus brief, because the brief appeared "to be nothing more
than an attempt to present a fact specific argument '' 0 of the same type as
was contained in the appellants' fifty page brief, a brief of the maximum
allowable length under the appellate rules.231 The court pointed out that
"[s]ince the parties are limited as to the number and length of briefs, amicus
briefs should not be used to simply give one side more exposure than the
rules contemplate."
2
The court expressed some further thoughts on the subject, indicating
that "it would be helpful to the court if [multiple] amicus would attempt to
join together in one brief and cooperate with the parties so as not to be
repetitious of the parties' briefs. 233 Further, the court said that "[iln the
interest of brevity, amicus briefs should not contain a statement of the case
or facts, but rather should get right to the additional information which the
amicus believes will assist the court.' 2 4 The court concluded its discussion
by noting that "although Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.370 does not
require a motion for leave to file an amicus brief to state whether the parties
have consented, it would be appropriate for the motion to contain that
information."3
227. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1562 (4th Dist. Ct. App. July 3, 1996).
228. Id. at D1562 (citing Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152 (D.C.S.C. 1974)).
229. Id. (citing Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1970)).
230. Id.
231. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210(a)(5).
232. Ciba-Geigy, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1562.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (citation omitted).
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XII. PROHIBITION
In Brooks v. Lockett,23 6 plaintiffs and prospective plaintiffs in a putative
class action suit in Orange County sought a writ of prohibition against a
circuit judge in Lake County, where a similar class action against the same
defendant was pending, who had entered an order abating the Orange County
proceeding,237 as well as other cases against the defendant.238 The fifth
district found that the Lake County judge "was not empowered to issue an
order staying a pending action in another jurisdiction. 2 39 It recognized that
"prohibition generally is not available to revoke an order already entered, ' 24°
but granted the writ nonetheless, 241 because "the order in the instant case
attempts to exert an ongoing effect on pending class-action litigation
involving [the defendant] throughout the State of Florida.,
242
XIV. THE EFFECT ON APPEALS OF PRIOR DENIALS OF PROHIBITION
In Barwick v. State,24 3 the defendant raised on appeal to the supreme
court from his convictions and sentences a claim that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for disqualification. This same issue had been the basis
for a pretrial petition for a writ of prohibition that the supreme court had
denied244 in an order which did not indicate the grounds for denial. 245
The State argued that the denial of prohibition should be deemed a
ruling on the merits of the issue.246 In support of this position, the State
relied on the third district's opinion in Obanion v. State,247 which was
advocated by (then Judge and present Supreme Court of Florida) Justice
Anstead's specially concurring opinion in the fourth district's decision in
236. 658 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
237. Lake County is located in the fifth circuit, while Orange County is located in the
ninth circuit. Id. at 1207.
238. Brooks, 658 So. 2d at 1206.
239. Id. at 1207.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1208.
242. Id. at 1207-08.
243. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995).
244. Id. at 690.
245. Id. at 69 1.
246. Id. at 690-91.
247. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.
1987).
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DeGennaro v. Janie Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,24s cases that the supreme court
categorized as "recogniz[ing] that a denial of a petition for writ of prohibi-
tion in those districts should henceforth constitute a ruling on the merits
unless otherwise indicated."249
The supreme court "approve[d] of the procedure adopted by the Third
District in Obanion and advocated by Justice Anstead's concurring opinion
in DeGennaro as to the effect of the denial of a petition for writ of prohibi-
tion in those district courts, ' ' 50 but did not agree that its denial of the petition
in Barwick was a decision on the merits.251 Noting that its order did not
indicate the grounds for the denial252 and the fact that the court had not
"clearly expressed an intention to have a denial of a petition for writ of
prohibition, without more, serve as a ruling on the merits,' z 3 the court
"recognize[d] a need to clarify the effect of this Court's denial of a prohibi-
tion petition.' 254
Satisfying the need that it had identified, the court stated:
248. 600 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Anstead, J., concurring specially).
249. Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 691. While Obanion certainly established this principle in
the third district, the impact of DeGennaro in the fourth district is less clear. Justice
Anstead's sentiments in that decision cannot be reconciled with those expressed by Judge
Farmer in his dissenting opinion in Thomason v. State, 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (Farmer, J., dissenting), quashed on other grounds, 620 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1993). In
Thomason, the defendant, who was appealing from an order withholding adjudication and
placing him on probation, raised a double jeopardy claim that he had previously asserted in a
petition for prohibition that had been denied without opinion. The court affirmed without
opinion, but Judge Farmer, who wrote primarily to dissent on the merits, discussed the
question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was proper in light of the prior
petition. He noted that such consideration was appropriate because "prohibition is an
extraordinarily prerogative writ... that is sometimes denied for good reasons having nothing
to do with the underlying merits of a petitioner's position." Id. at 312 n.2. He recognized that
his view was contrary to Obanion, but stated that the fourth district had never adopted the
Obanion approach and that he hoped it never would, "at least as long as prohibition is deemed
a matter of mere grace." Id. Although disagreeing with Judge Farmer on the merits of the
case, it appears that the other members of the panel agreed with him on the jurisdictional issue
because the case was affirmed, rather than dismissed, because Judge Stone wrote a specially
concurring opinion that set forth the reasons why he felt the case should be affirmed on the
merits, and because the court, on rehearing, certified a question that dealt only with the merits
of the case. Id. at 318.
250. Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 691.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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We hold that from this time forward, if an order from this Court
denying a petition for a writ of prohibition based upon an unsuc-
cessful motion for disqualification is to constitute a decision on the
merits and, thereby, foreclose further review of the disqualification
issue on direct appeal, the order will state that it is "with preju-
dice." 25
The court's decision to use qualifying language that refers only to a petition
"based upon an unsuccessful motion for disqualification"2 56 leaves open the
question of whether the court means to apply this same rationale when a
petition is based on some other ground, such as the double jeopardy issue in
Thomason or the speedy trial claim in Obanion.
The court's specific approval of the Obanion procedure for the third
district and the procedure advocated by Justice Anstead in DeGennaro for
the fourth district,2 57 while it adopted a different procedure for itself, at least
with regard to petitions raising disqualification issues, seems to indicate that
each district court will be allowed to adopt the approach it deems best.
XV. MOOTNESS
In J. M. v. State, 8 the third district reversed an adjudication of delin-
quency based on its conclusion that the trial court's stated reasons for its
departure from the recommendation made by the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("IRS") as to the appropriate level of restrictiveness
were not supported by the record.2 5 9 The district court remanded for a new
disposition hearing, finding that the issue was not moot even though the
juvenile had served his residential sentence and had been released by
HRS. 260 The court stated:
Depending upon the evidence, if any, presented at the new disposi-
tion hearing on remand, the trial court, in its finding of delin-
quency, may conceivably decide to withhold adjudication, impose
a less restrictive sentence and give the juvenile credit for the origi-
255. Barwick, 660 So. 2d at 691.
256. Id.
257. See supra note 249. This footnote addresses the reasons why the court's approval of
this procedure for the fourth district may not mean a great deal, since the fourth district itself
may prefer a different approach.
258. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
259. Id. at 892.
260. Id. at 893.
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nal sentence served or suspend entry of sentence altogether. As
stated by this court in R.A.B. v. State, 399 So.2d 16, (Fla 3d DCA
1981): '"The very fact of adjudication, apart from disposition, has
potential collateral effects which are not harmless." Id. at 18. In-
deed, a withhold of adjudication as opposed to an adjudication for
this offense would certainly be relevant to future dispositions if this
juvenile is ever rearrested or if he decided to enter a profession
which required him to disclose any juvenile record. See § 39.045,
Fla. Stat. (1993).261
XVI. HARMLESS ERROR
In Heuss v. State,262 the fourth district found that the trial court erred by
failing to make findings sufficient to support the admission of certain
statements. 263 The court concluded that the error was harmless, 264 however,
and affirmed the convictions and sentences under review. 265 In a motion for
rehearing, the defendant pointed out that the state had not made a harmless
error argument and contended that the court lacked authority to sua sponte
266
apply the harmless error doctrine.
Noting that section 59.041 of the Florida Statutes requires the court to
consider whether any error is harmless, 267 the court rejected the defendant's
contention. The court stated that it could "discern no public policy support-
ing a conclusion that a review court must reverse an otherwise valid convic-
tion for an error that is deemed harmless simply because harmless error was
not argued in the state's brief.
' 268
XVII. SANCTIONS
In several cases, orders were entered imposing sanctions on pro se
litigants. One particularly active litigant received sanctions from three
261. Id. (footnote omitted). See also FLA. STAT. § 39.045 (1993).
262. 660 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
263. Id. at 1057.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1058.
266. Id.
267. A similar requirement is set forth in section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes.
268. Heuss, 660 So. 2d at 1059.
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district courts. In Attwood v. Eighth Circuit Court,2 69 Attwood v. Single-
tary,270 and Attwood v. State ex rel. Florida Department of Corrections,271
the first, second, and fourth districts, respectively, decided to take action
against an individual who had instituted an extraordinary number of cases,
virtually all of which challenged prison conditions.272
Attwood had filed seventeen appeals or petitions in the first district in
the period of just over ten months preceding the court's order,273 seventeen
cases in the second district in the six-month period ending June 1, 1995,274
and thirty-one appeals or petitions in the fourth district in the first half of
1995.275 The fourth district also noted that Attwood had eighteen cases, one
of which had 200 defendants, pending in the circuit court for Martin
County,276 and that as of the date of a hearing held in October, 1993, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Attwood
had filed more than forty cases in that court.277 The fourth district addition-
ally pointed out that at the federal hearing, Attwood admitted that he had
also filed "several thousand' 278 internal grievances in the Florida system. 279
The first district indicated that its clerk's office received mail from
Attwood "on almost a daily basis." 2 0 The fourth district noted that at the
federal hearing, Attwood "admitted mailing 'pounds of mail a week' to the
courts." 28 1
In addition to commenting on the quantity of Attwood's efforts, the
district courts made it clear that they were unimpressed with the quality of
those efforts. The fourth district referred to Attwood's "frivolous claims,
' 282
the second district to his "baseless appeals, petitions, and related unauthor-
ized motions, 28 3 and the first district to his "simply incomprehensible"
284
269. 667 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
270. 659 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
271. 660 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
272. See Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 357 n.4; Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128; Department of
Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 358.
273. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
274. Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128.
275. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 358.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 359.
279. Id.
280. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 357.
281. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 359.
282. Id. at 360.
283. Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128.
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pleadings. Attwood's pleadings were also apparently quite repetitive. The
first district indicated that he filed "numerous copies of the same pleading in
different cases.' 85 The fourth added that he often "makes copies of what he
has already filed, signs the copied version, and handwrites an additional
allegation, which must be treated as a new petition or appeal. ' 2 6
The fourth district also expressed concern over the fact that Attwood,
claiming indigency, had paid no filing fees in any of his cases2 87 despite
evidence adduced at the federal hearing to the effect that he was the sole
owner of a rental income-generating apartment building with an estimated
value of $57,000 to $69,00028 and that he had a bank account about which
he refused to testify.289
The first district prohibited Attwood from filing any document on his
own behalf in the case under review or in any other case, as either appellant
or petitioner,290 directed its clerk to "refuse any document filed by Attwood
unless signed by a member of The Florida Bar"291 and, in Attwood's pending
cases that were not yet mature, afforded Attwood thirty days within which to
file and serve a notice of appearance of counsel,292 noting that it would
dismiss any case in which such a notice is not timely filed.293
The second district directed its clerk to reject the filing of all future
notices of appeal and petitions for extraordinary relief in civil matters sent
by or on behalf of Attwood unless submitted and signed by a member of The
294Florida Bar. The court stated that any papers filed in violation of its order
would be "automatically placed in an inactive file," 295 and that any notices of
appeal received from circuit courts would be "summarily stricken. 296 The
court noted that its order would not apply to any criminal appeal filed by
Attwood which directly concerns a judgment and sentence.29
284. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
285. Id at 357.
286. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 360.
287. Id at 358.
288. Id at 359.
289. Id.
290. Attwood, 667 So. 2d at 357.
291. Id
292. Id.
293. Id
294. Singletary, 659 So. 2d at 1128.
295. Id.
296. Id
297. Id.
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The fourth district ordered that Attwood "be denied indigent status for
the filing of appeals or petitions for extraordinary relief' 298 and directed its
clerk "to refuse any such notice of appeal or petition for filing unless
accompanied by the proper filing fee or submitted and assigned by a member
of the Florida Bar. 299  Like the second district, the court indicated that its
order would not apply to "any criminal appeal filed by Robert Attwood
which directly concerns a judgment and sentence. ''3 °°
The fifth district, apparently unaffected by Attwood's output, deter-
mined that sanctions were appropriate for another litigant. In Holmes v.
State,30 1 the court entertained a defendant's fifth petition for writ of habeas
corpus and his eleventh post-conviction proceeding, 30 2 all unsuccessful
challenges to a 1989 conviction and sentence.
30 3
Finding the defendant "has disrupted the fair allocation of judicial
resources of this court, '" 3°4 and "this activity now rises to the level of being
an abuse of process, 30 5 the court prohibited the defendant from filing "any
further pro se pleadings regarding his 1989 conviction and sentence."3°
XVIII. REHEARING
In Thompson v. Singletary,3 °7 the fourth district entered an initial
opinion ordering a new trial for a criminal defendant. No motion for
rehearing was filed within the fifteen days allowed by Rule 9.330(a) of the
309 3 10Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and mandate therefore issued.
The state subsequently filed an untimely motion for rehearing, a motion
to accept the motion for rehearing as timely filed and a motion to recall the
mandate.31 1 Attached to the motion for rehearing were portions of the trial
transcript not previously furnished to the court that demonstrated that the
298. Department of Corrections, 660 So. 2d at 360.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. 669 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
302. Id. at 360.
303. Id. at 360 n.1.
304. Id. at 361.
305. Id.
306. Holmes, 669 So. 2d at 361.
307. 659 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
308. Id. at 435-36.
309. Id. at 436.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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defendant was not in fact entitled to a new trial.312 Eleven days after the
state's motions were filed, and before the court ruled on them, the term of
court ended.313
The court found that the untimeliness of the motion for rehearing
presented no impediment to its consideration, because the fifteen-day time
limit of the rule is not jurisdictional 314 and the motion was filed in the same
term of court.315 The fact that the term of court ended after the issuance of
the mandate, however, was a matter of greater concern.
The court began its analysis by focusing on the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Judges
of District Court of Appeal, Fifth District.316 There, the district court
affirmed a case without opinion.317 When the appellant filed a motion for
rehearing four months later during the next term of court, the district court
denied the motion as untimely, but sua sponte decided to reconsider the case
en banc because it conflicted with an opinion in another case that was
written in the interim.318 The party opposing the rehearing then obtained a
writ of mandamus from the supreme court, which held that an appellate court
is without jurisdiction to recall its mandate beyond the term of court during
which the mandate was issued.319
After its discussion of State Farm, the fourth district pointed out that if
the state had called its attention to the impending expiration of the court's
term of court by designating its motion to recall mandate as an emergency
motion, the court would have recalled mandate before the end of the term.
320
The court noted that in the absence of such a designation, it had followed its
normal procedure with motions for rehearing, which is to hold them in the
321
clerk's office until a response is filed or the time for a response expires.By the time that process was completed, so was the term of the court.322
312. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 436.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 437.
316. 405 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1981).
317. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 436.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 436.
1996]
35
Musto: Appellate Practice
Published by NSUWorks, 1996
Nova Law Review
The court next turned its attention to Washington v. State,323 a case in
which the supreme court stated that "[t]he prevailing rule is that an appellate
court is without power to recall a mandate regularly issued without inadver-
tence and resume jurisdiction of the cause after the expiration of the term at
which its judgment was rendered and the mandate issued. ' 324 The supreme
court in Washington also recognized "the power.., to recall a mandate sent
down by inadvertence."
325
Seizing on the references in Washington to "inadvertence," the fourth
district concluded that its failure to grant the State's motion to recall the
mandate during the eleven day period between its filing and the expiration of
the term of court was "inadvertent under Washington. ,326 Repeating its
previous pronouncement that it would have recalled mandate prior to the end
of the term had the State called its attention to the need to do SO, 32 7 the court
concluded that "[u]nder these facts, which we believe make this case
distinguishable from State Farm, ... we have not lost jurisdiction." 328 The
court therefore granted the State's motions, withdrew its original opinion,32 9
and denied relief on the merits.
330
XIX. APPELLATE ATroRNEYS' FEES
A. Offer of Judgment on Appeal
In Deleuw, Cather & Co. v. Grogis,331 when the fourth district upheld a
trial court's judgment taxing costs, the appellee moved for appellate attor-
ney's fees and costs on the basis of an offer of judgment served during the
pendency of the appeal.332 The court struck the motion and the offer of
judgment based on its conclusion that section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
under which the offer was made, "does not contain any language which
would indicate that the legislature contemplated its use during appeals. 333
323. 110 So. 259 (Fla. 1926).
324. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 261.
326. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 437.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The original opinion was published in the advance sheets at 655 So. 2d 1282. It was
not included in the bound volume, however, in light of the fact that it was withdrawn.
330. Thompson, 659 So. 2d at 437.
331. 664 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
332. Id. at 989.
333. 1&.
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Additionally, the court found the statute inapplicable to the case under
review because the statute applies only to damages 334 and the proceeding
dealt only with the correctness of the amount of costs, 335 which are not
considered a part of a claim which forms the basis of a suit.
336
B. Violations of the Government in the Sunshine Law
In School Board of Alachua County v. Rhea,337 the first district rejected
a claim that because section 286.011(4) of the Florida Statutes provides that
"the court shall assess a reasonable attorney's fee" against agencies deter-
mined to have violated the Government in the Sunshine Law, there is no
requirement for a party seeking appellate attorney's fees in such a case to
file a motion in the appellate court.338 The court found that the statute's
mandatory language "does not supersede the requirements of Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.400(b),,, 339 which dictates that such motions must be
filed in the appellate court, "nor does it authorize the trial court to make an
initial award of appellate attorney's fees."'
340
XX. MANDATE
The supreme court, in State v. Roberts,341 clarified the procedure for
obtaining a stay or recall of a district court's mandate when discretionary
review is sought. The issue came before the court after the first district's
denial of a motion to recall mandate.342 The motion had been filed four days
after the party seeking the recall had filed a notice invoking the supreme
court's discretionary jurisdiction. In its denial, the district court relied on the
supreme court's opinion in State v. McKinnon343 for the proposition that a
party desiring a stay of mandate during the pendency of a petition for review
must apply to the supreme court for the stay.3"
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Deleuw, 664 So. 2d at 989.
337. 661 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
338. Id. at 332.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 661 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1995).
342. Id at 821.
343. 540 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1989).
344. Roberts, 661 So. 2d at 821.
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The supreme court recognized that McKinnon "contained language" 345
supporting such a conclusion, but pointed out that "the issue in that case was
,,346
not where the motion for stay should be filed. Rather, the court stated,
the holding of McKinnon was that the pendency of a petition for review "did
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to resentence a defendant pursuant
to the district court's mandate which had reversed and remanded the case for
resentencing. 347 Ending any confusion as to the effect of McKinnon, the
court stated that "[w]hile a motion for stay and to recall a mandate may be
filed in this Court, it may also be filed in the district court of appeal. 348
Relying on Rule 9.130(a) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which indicates that lower tribunals "have continuing jurisdiction" 349 to
consider motions for stay pending review, the court said, "[t]he fact that a
notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this court has already been
filed does not deprive the district court of appeal of jurisdiction to rule upon
the motion. 350 In fact, the court went on to indicate that "[g]enerally
speaking, the Court prefers that motion for stay be filed in the district court
of appeal because at that stage of the case the district court ordinarily will be
better informed concerning the case and thereby better able to predict the
likelihood of this Court's accepting jurisdiction. 351  The court therefore
receded from McKinnon "to the extent that it suggests that the filing of a
notice to invoke discretionary jurisdiction precludes the district court of
appeal from entertaining a motion to stay or withdraw its mandate.
352
XXI. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Death of Defendant
In State v. Clements,353 the supreme court dealt with the effect of
defendants' deaths during the pendency of direct appeals from judgments
and sentences. Despite the fact that each of the district courts of appeal had
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 821-22.
348. Id. at 822.
349. Roberts, 661 So. 2d at 822.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. 668 So. 2d 980 (FIa. 1996).
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found abatement ab initio to be proper under such circumstances,35 4 the
supreme court concluded that "the appeal of a conviction may be dismissed
but is not to be abated ab initio.'355 The court pointed out that the theory
upon which abatement ab initio had been applied was the fact that it left in
effect upon a defendant's death the legal presumption of innocence.3 5 6 The
court found such reasoning inapplicable in light of the fact that "the pre-
sumption of innocence ceases 'upon the adjudication of guilt and the entry of
sentence,"' 357 and the fact that "a judgment of conviction comes for review
with a presumption in favor of its regularity or correctness."
358
The court went on to indicate, however, that even dismissal is not
mandated. Finding that "monetary fines or penalties continue to be enforce-
able against assets which comprise a defendant's estate, ' 359 the court stated
that in such situations, "the estate maintains the same right to appeal that the
defendant would have had if living' 360 and that the state may also "have an
interest in seeing the appeal completed. ' 361 Thus, the court concluded that
"when a defendant dies after judgment but during an appeal, the appellate
court may, upon a showing of good cause by the State or a representative of
the defendant, determine that the appeal should proceed. 362
B. Belated Appeals
The fourth district grudgingly reversed a defendant's sentence in
Gilbert v. State363 by applying, to a belated appeal, the general rule that
appellate courts decide cases in accordance with the law in effect at the time
of the appellate decision.364 The court felt that it was bound by supreme
court precedent3 65 to apply this general rule despite "question[ing] its
354. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 648 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Carstens
v. State, 638 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Jackson v. State, 559 So. 2d 320 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Kearns v. State, 536 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Cruz
v. State, 137 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
355. Clements, 668 So. 2d at 981.
356. Id.
357. Id. (quoting Vaccaro v. State, 11 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. 1942)).
358. Clements, 668 So. 2d at 981 (citing Vaccaro, 11 So. 2d at 188; Hitchcock v. State,
413 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1982)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960 (1982).
359. Clements, 668 So. 2d at 982.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. 667 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
364. Id. at 971.
365. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985).
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propriety in cases of a belated appeal, especially one [such as the case under
review] which is not brought until after the favorable case law change has
been announced. 366
The court expressed its belief that "a defendant should not be allowed
to sit back and await a favorable change in the law before claiming a right to
appeal, as the appellant did here. 367 Indicating that it did not believe it
should "take two years to discover and bring to the court's attention' '368 a
trial counsel's dereliction of the duty to file a notice of appeal when re-
quested to do so, the court suggested "that the time for bringing a claim for
ineffectiveness based on trial counsel's failure to appeal should be even
more limited than a routine motion for ineffectiveness pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850,,,369 a rule which presently requires such
motions to be filed within two years of conviction,370 one year in capital
cases.
371
Judge Glickstein wrote a specially concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority on the merits of the case, but "abstain[ed] from
their expressed concerns as to the policy matters beyond the issues.
372
C. Appeals by the State
1. Appeals Taken After the Jury is Sworn
In State v. Livingston,373 a motion to suppress, filed prior to jury
selection, was heard after the jury was sworn but before opening state-
ments.374 The trial court granted the motion and subsequently granted a
mistrial.375
The State appealed from the order granting the motion to suppress and
the defendant contended that the order was not appealable because the jury
had been sworn prior to the suppression hearing. 376 The second district
366. Gilbert, 667 So. 2d at 971.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b).
371. Id.
372. Gilbert, 667 So. 2d at 971 (Glickstein, J., concurring specially).
373. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1237 (2d Dist. Ct. App. May 22, 1996).
374. Id. at D1237-38.
375. Id. It is not clear from the opinion which party requested the mistrial, whether the
mistrial had any relation to the motion to suppress or whether the mistrial was granted before
opening statements or at some point thereafter.
376. Livingston, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1238.
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disagreed, concluding that "the granting of a motion to suppress followed by
a mistrial results in an order appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B)." 37
2. Effect of Nolle Prosse
The State sought certiorari review of two pretrial evidentiary rulings in
State v. Spence.378 After the trial court entered the orders in question, the
State nolle prossed the case.37 9 Some three weeks later, the State refiled an
information alleging the same crime.3 0  The State then filed its timely
petitions for certiorari.81
Relying on the supreme court's decision in State v. Vazquez, 382 the court
found that the evidentiary rulings had "no carryover effect upon the new
information. 383 Given this fact, the court called the attempt to obtain review
of the rulings a "request for a futile act 384 and denied the State's petitions.385
"Even though the new case may constitute an identical allegation, 386 the
court stated, "it nonetheless constitutes a separate case and we cannot reach
back and rule and determine the validity of orders entered in a previous case
that is no longer in existence."
387
The court warned that the filing of a nolle prosse "may have awesome
consequences which should be contemplated before such action is taken, 388
and indicated that it "prepared this opinion to point out the pitfall in the
course of action taken by the state in the instant case."
389
3. Pretrial Orders Declaring a Sentencing Statute Unconstitutional
In State v. Peloquin,3 ° the second district dealt with consolidated
appeals by the State from orders declaring the DUI vehicle impoundment
377. Id.
378. 658 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
379. Id. at 661.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 450 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1984).
383. Spence, 658 So. 2d at 661.
384. Id.
385. Id
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Spence, 658 So. 2d at 661.
389. Id
390. 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2744 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1995).
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law391 unconstitutional .392 The court noted that the defendants in the cases
under review had not yet gone to trial or pleaded to the charges 393 and that
the issue of vehicle impoundment does not arise until after conviction.
Under these circumstances, the court dismissed the appeals, 395 stating that
"[a] pretrial order declaring a statute or ordinance unconstitutional, and
doing nothing more regarding the underlying case, is not appealable, ' 396 and
that since "these orders relate to sentencing, and do not impact the trial of
the cases, they do not meet the standard for review by certiorari. 397
D. Motions for Post Conviction Relief
1. Summary Denial
In Davis v. State,398 the fourth district discussed the procedure it follows
in reviewing summary denials of motions for postconviction relief.399 The
court noted that appeals in such cases are governed by Rule 9.140(g) of the
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 400 which requires the court to review
"the arguments made therein together with the order of denial and the
attachments thereto,"'' 1 and which states, "[u]nless the record shows
conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be
reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing."4 2 The court
went on to note that if its review "shows a preliminary basis for reversing the
trial court's order,"4 3 the court will order a response from the state and will
then "allow the appellant to reply."'4 4 If the record does not show such a
basis, the court continued, "neither the appellant nor the state are required to
file briefs. ' '4°S
391. FLA. STAT. § 316.193(6)(d) (1993).
392. Peloquin, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D2744.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. (citation omitted).
397. Peloquin, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at D2744.
398. 660 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
399. Id. at 1162.
400. Id
401. Id.
402. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.140(g).
403. Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1162.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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The court took the opportunity to explain its process because "we have
noted of late many pro se appellants filing briefs on orders denying postcon-
viction relief without a hearing."4°6 Stating that it "would have already
disposed of this case as an affirmance but for the fact''4 7 that the appellant
filed a brief,4°8 the court opined that such briefs "may in fact slow the
process of our review" 409 and "[g]enerally ... are not considered, because
either the arguments were made in the postconviction relief motion, or they
improperly raise additional issues not contained in ' 410 the motion.
2. Orders Granting in Part and Denying in Part
In Cooper v. State,411 the second district found to be appealable an order
granting in part and denying in part a motion for postconviction relief filed
under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 1 2 Such an
order, the court concluded, "marks the end of the judicial labor which is to
be expended on the motion, and the order is final for appellate purposes."
413
The court drew a distinction between such an order and one that denies a
claim in a postconviction motion but grants an evidentiary hearing on a
different claim in the same motion. 4  In such circumstances, the court
stated, the order is "not appealable until all issues raised have been ruled
upon by the court, ' 415 because "U]udicial economy ... forbids piecemeal
appeals until all pending matters raised in a single motion have been re-
solved and ... can then be efficiently reviewed in one appellate proceed-ing.'9416
E. Cross-Appeals
In Page v. State,4 17 a criminal defendant appealed from a conviction and
the state cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court erroneously suppressed
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Davis, 660 So. 2d at 1162.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. 667 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
412. Id. at 933.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Cooper, 667 So. 2d at 933.
417. 677 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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a statement.41 8 The first district affirmed the conviction and, in light of that
resolution, declined to address the issue raised on cross-appeal.
419
The court recognized section 924.07(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes,
which states, in pertinent part: "Once the state's cross-appeal is instituted,
the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state
regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal. 420  Concluding,
however, that compliance with that provision in a case such as the one under
review would "be rendering what amounted to nothing more than an advi-
sory opinion," 421 the court found that "to the extent the statute purports to
dictate to the courts what issues must be addressed, regardless of necessity, it
constitutes a violation of the separation of powers. 422 The court certified
the following question to the supreme court as one of great public impor-
tance:
IS SECTION 924.07(l)(d), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995),
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPAL
[SIC] OF SEPARATION OF POWERS TO THE EXTENT THAT
IT PURPORTS TO MANDATE THAT AN APPELLATE
COURT MUST RULE UPON ISSUES RAISED BY THE STATE
IN A CROSS-APPEAL, REGARDLESS OF THE DISPOSITION
OF THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL?
423
F. Disqualification of Counsel
In Colton v. State,424 a criminal defendant appealing his conviction, who
was represented by the Public Defender's Office, moved to disqualify
counsel for the State.42* The motion was based on the fact that at the time of
the filing of the notice of appeal, counsel for the state had been employed as
a trial attorney by the Public Defender's Office representing the defen-
dant.42
6
418. hid at 55.
419. Id. at 56.
420. FLA. STAT. 924.07(1)(d) (1995).
421. Id.
422. Page, 677 So. 2d at 56.
423. Id.
424. 667 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
425. Id. at 342.
426. Id.
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Resolving all factual disputes in favor of the defendant,427 the first
district denied the motion. The court found a number of facts to be of
significance, including the fact that: 1) the attorney did not represent the
defendant at trial or on any previous matter;428 2) the defendant did not assert
that the attorney had received any confidential information, but only that it
was possible that he could have been exposed to such information;429 and 3)
the attorney filed an affidavit in which he stated that he was not privy or
exposed to any information regarding appellate cases, including the defen-
dant's appeal. 430
The court noted that there is no rule of Professional Conduct that
specifically addresses successive government to government employment
when those interests are adverse431 and rejected the defendant's effort to
extend to the facts of the case the dictates of Rule 2.060(c) of the Florida
Rules of Judicial Administration, which "prohibits former judicial research
aides from participating in any manner in any proceeding that was docketed
in the court during the term of service or prior thereto." 4
32
The court therefore addressed the issue in terms of whether the repre-
sentation resulted in an appearance of impropriety, noting first that such an
evaluation must be done on a case-by-case basis.433 In finding no appearance
of impropriety to exist, the court pointed out that "arguments made at trial
and on appeal are distinct and involve differing strategies," 434 that appellate
courts are "bound by the record and arguments made at the trial court
level, 435 matters with which the attorney in the case under review was not
involved,436 and that any "anonymous information '437 the attorney might
have overheard while with the Public Defender's Office would be viewed by
the court as "of little value in the appellate process. 438
427. The court noted that if the case had turned on the factual disputes, it would have
appointed a special master to make factual findings. Id.
428. Id. at 343.
429. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 343.
430. Id. at 342.
431. Id. at 342-43.
432. Id. at 343.
433. Id.
434. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 343.
435. Id.
436. L
437. Il
438. Id.
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G. Out-of-Time Rehearing
In Spaziano v. State,439 a criminal defendant with a pending death
warrant filed two out-of-time motions for rehearing. One motion was
directed to the affirmance, thirteen years earlier on direct appeal, of the
judgment and sentence of death and the other was directed to the affirmance,
nine years earlier, of the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief.
440
The court noted that the motions were "clearly not authorized." 44 It
went on, however, consistent with its "constitutional responsibility to refrain
from dismissing a cause solely because an improper remedy has been
sought,"442 to consider the contents of the motions and a supporting affidavit
"to determine whether they have any basis for relief under our jurisdic-
tion. ' 43 Such consideration led to the conclusion that one issue raised by
the defendant, relating to newly discovered evidence of the recantation of the
testimony of a significant witness, was a proper subject for a successive
motion for post-conviction relief under Rules 3.850 and 3.851 of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure.44 The supreme court therefore remanded the
matter to the trial court for consideration of that issue.
445
XXII. APPEALS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
A. Final Orders
The question of what constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal,
when parental rights are terminated was dealt with by the fifth district in
Moore v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.44 6 Uncertainty
existed on this point because the statutory scheme applicable to such cases
contemplates the entry of two written orders.447 The first order, pursuant to
section 39.467 of the Florida Statutes, is to be entered after the adjudicatory
hearing and is to set forth "the findings of fact and conclusions of law."" 8
The second, pursuant to section 39.469(3), is a subsequent order of disposi-
439. 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1995).
440. Id. at 1364.
441. Id. at 1365.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Spaziano, 660 So. 2d at 1365-66.
445. Il at 1366.
446. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
447. Id. at 1139.
448. FLA. STAT. § 39.467(5) (1995).
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tion "briefly stating the facts upon which [the court's] decision to terminate
the parental rights is made."449
The district court held that "it is the second or dispositional order which
is the final order for purposes of appeal."450 Although the notice of appeal in
the case under review was directed to the initial adjudicatory order, the court
reached the merits of the appellant's claims, concluding that "a notice of
appeal directed to an adjudicatory order should simply be treated as a
premature notice which is held in abeyance until entry of the dispositional
order."1
4 51
B. Lack of Issue of Arguable Merit
In Ostrum v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,452 an
appeal was taken from a final order terminating parental rights. The appel-
lant's court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant
to the dictates of Anders v. California.4 3
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court established the procedure
to be employed by court-appointed counsel in criminal appeals when they
find no issues of arguable merit. As capsulized in Ostrum, such attorneys
are to file a brief "detailing the proceedings below with a discussion of
where error might be suggested and why none actually appears." 454
The fourth district granted the motion to withdraw, but also took the
opportunity to establish the proper procedure to be employed when court-
appointed counsel finds no issues of arguable merit in appeals from orders
terminating parental rights.455
The court concluded that "the full panoply of Anders procedures" 56 do
not apply in such situations. The court relied in part on the fact that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to termination of parental
rights cases because they are purely civil in nature,457 and the conclusion that
449. Id. § 39.469(3) (1995).
450. Moore, 664 So. 2d at 1139.
451. Id.
452. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
453. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
454. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. The court recognized that the right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases
is compelled by both the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution, albeit on a
due process theory. See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 1980).
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"the interest of the children in quitting the uncertainties surrounding their
future should be put to rest as soon as it can fairly be done. 458
"More importantly, however," 459 the court stated, "Anders represents a
radical departure from the traditional role of appellate judges as neutral
decision makers without bias or prejudice for or against any party,"4 6
turning the judges instead "into advocates for the party whose counsel seeks
to withdraw."46'
"Whatever may be the rationale for requiring that departure from
neutrality in criminal cases," 462 the court continued, "we are quite unwilling
to allow it in purely civil matters. To do so is to favor one class of litigants
over the other. That circumstance will understandably be seen by other
parties as a classic denial of equal protection of the law. 463
Accordingly, the court concluded that in cases of this nature, counsel
should simply move to withdraw.464 The court then set forth the procedure
that it will follow with such motions. As in other civil appeals, the court will
give the party a period of time within which to argue the case without an
attorney."5 If the party fails to file a brief, the court will dismiss the appeal
for failure to prosecute.466 If the party does file a brief and it fails to present
a preliminary basis for reversal, the court will summarily affirm under Rule
9.315 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.467 If the brief does
present a preliminary basis for reversal, the case will proceed as an ordinary
appeal.468
In Jiminez v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,4 9 the
third district applied the Ostrum reasoning to similar facts, noting addition-
ally one point not specifically addressed by, but presumably implicit in,
Ostrum. The Jiminez court stated that in cases in which a party's brief does
show a preliminary basis for reversal, the "court will retain discretion to
458. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Ostrum, 663 So. 2d at 1361.
469. 669 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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deny the motion to withdraw and direct that appointed counsel proceed with
the appeal. 470
XXIII. APPEALS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES
In Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Division,471 the appel-
lant's notice of appeal from an order denying a claim for compensation was
mailed to the district court two days before the expiration of the thirty-day
period for filing such notices,472 but was not received until after that period
had expired.473
The appellant filed a "Motion for Extension or in the Alternative
Motion for Remand," 474 requesting that the appeal be accepted as timely or
that the case be remanded to the judge of compensation claims ("JJC") to
determine whether excusable neglect existed so as to allow the JJC to vacate
and reenter the already final order.475 The motion was accompanied by an
affidavit of appellant's counsel's secretary stating that she had called the
clerk's office of the district court and was given erroneous information that
the notice of appeal would be timely if it was postmarked within the thirty-
day period.476 The district court denied the motion and dismissed the
appeal.477
The appellant then filed with the JJC a motion for rehearing and motion
to vacate based on the same grounds as the motion in the district court.478 At
the hearing on the motion, appellant's counsel testified that he was aware of
the fact that the notice had to actually be filed within thirty days,479 that he
had instructed his staff on the point,4 0 and that his secretary had acted on her
own in contacting the clerk's office.481 The JJC vacated the original order
and reentered an identical order to allow the appellant an opportunity to
appeal.482
470. Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
471. 672 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1996).
472. FLA. R. WORK. COMP. P. 4.165(a).
473. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
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The appellant instituted a timely appeal from the second order and the
appellee cross-appealed, challenging the vacation of the original order.483
The district court agreed with the appellee, holding that the JJC was without
jurisdiction to vacate and reenter the judgment.484
The supreme court approved the district court's decision485 and found it
to be inapplicable to the case relied upon by the appellant, New Washington
Heights Community Development Conference v. Department of Community
Affairs.4
86
In New Washington Heights, the appellant's counsel's secretary
telephoned the clerk of an administrative agency and was erroneously told
that the agency would consider an appeal from one of its orders to be filed as
of the postmark date, if sent by certified mail.487 The third district dismissed
the appeal, but did so "without prejudice to the appellant to apply to the
Department to vacate and re-enter the operative order. ' 488 The court stated
that "[i]f the Department acts favorably upon such application, the appellant
may timely appeal the re-entered order and thereby challenge the merits of
the original adverse agency action., 489 The court's decision was based on
the principle that "where state action deprives a party of the ability to file a
timely notice of appeal, the appellate court, although deprived of jurisdiction
over the appeal, will provide the thus-rejected appellant with an alternative
,,490avenue of review.
The supreme court found that the reasoning of New Washington Heights
was "not dispositive ' 49' in Millinger "for at least two reasons. 492 First, the
court stated, the untimely notice in Millinger "was not the direct result of
misrepresentations of a state official. 49 3 Second, the court continued, not
only was it "both inappropriate and unnecessary for counsel's secretary to
call the court clerk for legal advice ' 494 in Millinger because "[i]t is a settled
rule of law that mailing, as opposed to filing, a notice within the thirty-day
483. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
484. Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Div., 655 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
485. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 25.
486. 515 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
487. Id. at 329.
488. Id. at 330.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 329-30.
491. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 26.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
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filing period is insufficient to preserve appellate rights, '49 5 but the appel-
lant's "counsel admitted that he knew the notice had to be filed in the district
court within the thirty-day filing period. 496 Under these facts, the court
found that "[i]t was counsel's responsibility to adequately supervise and
instruct his staff to ensure" 497 that the notice was timely filed. The court
also "disapprove[d] New Washington Heights to the extent that it is incon-
sistent with our holding here.,
498
The supreme court additionally rejected a claim that because a JJC
"may ... do all things comformable to law which may be necessary to
enable him effectively to discharge the duties of his office,, 49 9 the JJC had
the "inherent authority to vacate and reenter his final order."5°° The appel-
lant's argument in this regard was based on the decision in Morgan Yacht
Corp. v. Edwards,501 which interpreted section 440.331(1) "as giving a JJC
the authority to rescind his approval of a settlement upon discovering that
the settlement was based on the claimant's 'flagrant fraud and misrepresen-
tations.' 5
02
The supreme court distinguished Morgan Yacht on the basis that
counsel in Millinger did not miss the deadline "due to fraud or deliberate
deception," 503 but because he "failed to manage his office professionally.
XXV. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
A. Final Orders
In A.N. v. State,5°5 an appeal was taken by a juvenile from an adjudica-
tion of delinquency.5 6 The State moved to dismiss, asserting that the order
of adjudication was a nonappealable, nonfmal order.507
495. Id. (citations omitted).
496. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 26.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 27.
499. FLA. STAT. § 440.33(1) (1993).
500. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 27.
501. 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
502. Millinger, 672 So. 2d at 27 (quoting Morgan Yacht, 386 So. 2d at 884).
503. Id.
504. Id. (footnote omitted).
505. 666 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
506. Id. at 929.
507. Id.
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The third district pointed out that under the Florida Constitution, the
right to appeal interlocutory orders exists only "to the extent provided by
rules adopted by the supreme court" 508 and that the supreme court has not
adopted a rule that permits interlocutory appeals in juvenile delinquency
cases.509 The court recognized the fact that the legislature "created the right
to appeal a final order in a delinquency case by enacting paragraph
39.069(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). "51 The court noted, however, that the
statute "does not itself define what is a final order in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding. 5 1'
Agreeing with the first district's decisions in C.L.S. v. State512 and
T.L.W. v. Soud,51 3 which found that the final order in a delinquency case is
the order of disposition because that order marks the end of the judicial labor
in the case,514 the third district concluded that since no disposition order had
been entered,515 there existed no appealable order516 and dismissal was
517appropriate.
B. Evidence Sufficient to Prove Only Lesser Included Offense
In LT. v. State,51 8 the second district found the evidence insufficient to
support adjudications of delinquency based on the offense of grand theft
auto. 519 The court concluded, however, that the evidence did support a
finding of trespass in a conveyance.
520
Citing to the supreme court's decision in Gould v. State,521 the second
district recognized that when an appellate court finds the evidence insuffi-
cient in a criminal case to support the offense for which a defendant was
convicted, but sufficient to prove a lesser included offense, the appellate
508. FLA. CONST., art. V, § 4(b)(1).
509. A.N., 666 So. 2d at 930.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. 586 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
513. 645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review dismissed, 650 So. 2d 992
(Fla. 1995).
514. A.N., 666 So. 2d at 930.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. 657 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
519. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(2)(c) (1993).
520. Id. § 810.08(1) (1993).
521. 577 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 1991).
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court can order the trial court to enter a conviction for the lesser crime only
when that crime is a necessarily lesser included offense.
522
The court pointed out, however, that in G.C. v. State,-52 the third district
concluded that "an appellate court may affirm a juvenile adjudication on an
alternative ground that is not a necessary lesser included offense," 524 and that
the supreme court, in its review of the third district's decision,525 iapproved
this procedure."
526
The court acknowledged that in N.C. v. State,527 the fourth district
followed a different procedure, reversing an adjudication for grand theft auto
and discharging the juvenile defendant based on Gould.528 Concluding,
however, that Gould is limited to adult criminal cases, 529 and that the
supreme court did not intend in Gould to overrule G.C.,530 the court affirmed
the adjudications in LT. with directions to modify them to reflect trespass in
a conveyance as their basis.531 The court also certified conflict with N.C.
532
C. Sentencing
In J.M. v. State,533 the third district concluded that a trial court's
departure from the recommendations set forth by HRS in a delinquency
disposition proceeding is appealable. 534  The court relied on section
39.052(3)(e)3 of the Florida Statutes, which states: "The court shall commit
the child to the department at the restrictiveness level identified [by HRS] or
may order placement at a different restrictiveness level.... Any party may
appeal the court's findings resulting in a modified level of restrictiveness
pursuant to this subparagraph. 535
522. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
523. 560 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
524. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
525. State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991).
526. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
527. 581 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
528. LT., 657 So. 2d at 1242.
529. Id.
530. Id
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. 677 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
534. Id. at 891.
535. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(e)3 (1993).
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Judge Cope dissented, believing that the court is not permitted to review
a trial court's discretionary sentencing decision536 because of section
39.052(3)(k) of the Florida Statutes.537 That provision states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the criteria set forth in
paragraph (d) are general guidelines to be followed at the discre-
tion of the court and not mandatory requirements of procedure. It
is not the intent of the Legislature to provide for the appeal of the
disposition made pursuant to this subsection.
538
The majority, however, interpreted the second sentence of section
39.052(3)(k) to refer to the first sentence of the provision.5 39 "That is to
say,' the court indicated, "we believe the legislature did not intend to
create an appealable issue out of the fact that the trial court considered only
certain of the criteria listed in paragraph (d) and not other listed criteria.' 541
The majority also found what it considered to be "a second, more
fundamental reason for why this statutory provision cannot be construed to
preclude appellate review.'5 42 Noting that "[t]he commitment of a child to
HRS is a deprivation of liberty which triggers significant due process
protection, 543 the court stated that it "simply cannot agree with an interpre-
tation of any statutory language which permits such a fundamental liberty
interest to rest solely on the unbridled discretion of the trial judge."544
The court went on to note that in A.S. v. State,545 it had found that the
trial court violated a juvenile's constitutional rights by imposing a harsher
sentence than that recommended by HRS because the juvenile had exercised
his constitutional right to assert his innocence, even after adjudication as a
delinquent.546 The court stated that if there was no right for juveniles to
appeal their dispositions, the juvenile in A.S. would have had to "serve a
536. Judge Cope indicated that the question was not whether there existed an appealable
order, but whether the trial court's departure from the recommendation made by HRS was an
appealable issue. Id. at 894-95 (Cope J., dissenting).
537. Id. at 896 (Cope, J., dissenting).
538. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(k) (1993).
539. J. M., 677 So. 2d at 891-92.
540. Id. at 892.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. J.M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
545. 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
546. J. M., 677 So. 2d at 892.
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significantly enhanced sentence as a result of his exercise of a fundamental
constitutional right."547 The court indicated that in its view, such a result
was "unfathomable."
548
D. Juvenile Restitution
In State v. C.W-,54 9 the fourth district dismissed an appeal by the state
from a final order denying restitution in a juvenile proceeding.550 The court
recognized that such orders can be appealed in criminal cases under section
924.07(1)(k) of the Florida Statutes,51 but pointed out that there is no
comparable provision in sections 39.069(1)(b) and 39.0711,552 which list the
types of orders from which the state may appeal in juvenile proceedings.
XXV. APPEALS IN BOND VALIDATION CASES
In Rowe v. St. Johns County,553 an appeal from a decision declaring a
proposed bond issue valid,554 the named appellant filed a notice of appeal,
but did not submit the initial brief.55 Rather, the appellants were "three
citizens who did not intervene in the bond validation proceeding below."
556
The supreme court found that "as citizens and taxpayers" 5 7 of the county
that authorized the issuance of the bonds, the three appellants "were proper
parties to that proceeding and thus may properly appear for the first time on
appeal.
558
XXVI. A LOOK TO THE FuTURE
In the upcoming year, the supreme court, pursuant to Rule 2.130 of the
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, will adopt its four-year cycle
amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is likely that
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. 662 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
550. Id. at 769.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. 668 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1996).
554. Id. at 197.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 197-98.
558. Rowe, 668 So. 2d at 198.
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these amendments will significantly impact the appellate process in Florida.
Of course, the supreme court and the courts of appeal will also provide
answers to many of the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article.
The answers, as they usually do, will likely generate new questions. Those
questions, and others, will continue to provide the large number of court
decisions that shape the field of appellate practice.
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